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Intermediaries’ Precarious Balance Within 
Europe: Oddly Placed Cooperative Burdens in the 
Online World 
By Anjanette H. Raymond* 
The Newzbin cases mark a clear shift in the responsibility that European based internet 
service providers must take in protecting intellectual property rights.  Previously, that 
burden laid primarily with rights holders.  Today, however, legislative bodies and courts 
in both the European Union and the United States have shifted the expectation of 
protections to a shared burden amongst internet service providers (ISPs) and rights 
holders.  The SABAM case begins to outline and define the full parameters of that 
shared burden.  However, numerous issues exist in relation to the amount of burden each 
party must undertake within this shared burden standard and to date few reasonable 
responses have been advanced to assist ISPs in living up to this shared burden without 
being subjected to additional costs and potential liability.  The law remains fragmented, 
with potential minefields abounding for ISP liability, despite the fact that service 
providers often work hard to comply with the law.  Something must change.  Namely, the 
entire online community—rights holders, ISPs and the online users —must share the 
burden of protecting intellectual property holders’ rights in a way that makes sense for 
all parties.  Placing an unsustainable burden upon ISPs will not benefit anyone and will 
lead to undesirable consequences. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  On November 24, 2011, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck a blow for 
those who believe that ISPs should not have to monitor their users for copyright 
infringement.  The ruling stems from the Belgian case of Scarlet Extended v. SABAM
1
 in 
which an ISP provider was issued an injunction by the Brussels Court of First Instance 
requiring it to install filtering systems as a way to prevent copyright infringement.  The 
company appealed the verdict and the Brussels Court of Appeals asked the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) to clarify if such an injunction would be in violation of European 
Union laws.  The ECJ ruled that requiring an ISP to perform general monitoring of 
consumer traffic to protect the right of intellectual property is incompatible with the E-
Commerce Directive and other individual rights safeguarded by the European Union 
 
*
 Assistant Professor, Department of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of 
Business; Visiting Fellow in International Commercial Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen 
Mary, University of London.  All errors, ommisions and opinions are my own.  The author would like to 
thank Jeremy Shere and Tony Kelly for their editing and comments. 
1
 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs (SABAM), 
2011 E.C.R. I-0000. There is a second SABAM case, entitled SABAM v. Netlog, C-360/10 (16 Feb 2012). 
This paper will use the “SABAM” designation as a reference to the first case, Scarlet Extended [2011] 
ECR-I 0000.  
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Charter of Fundamental Rights.  While the ruling might seem unremarkable since 
European Union law has long recognized protections for ISPs in such situations, many 
herald the decision as clarifying key issues at the intersection of these laws, such as the 
amount of burden an ISP business must undertake and the specifics in relation to the 
burden.  However, in making its determination, the SABAM Court highlights but fails to 
resolve a growing concern for internet service providers: namely, the degree to which 
ISPs must bear the burden of protecting intellectual property rights. 
¶2  This article will first consider the creation of the “shared burden” in the online 
world for the protection of intellectual property rights through an examination of the 
Newzbin cases.  The article will go on to demonstrate that the SABAM case should be 
viewed as both (1) affirming the Newzbin court’s determination of a shared burden and 
(2) beginning to define the parameters of service provider policing burdens in the online 
world.  The article will next examine the SABAM balance in light of practical realities in 
the online world.  Finally, the article criticizes and then suggests guidelines for the best 
way to protect intellectual property right holders and service providers. 
II. CREATING A SYSTEM OF SHARED BURDENS TO PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
¶3  The United States and the European Union have long recognized the need to 
protect ISPs from potential liability arising from parties using their services to infringe 
intellectual property rights.
2
  Numerous European Union directives exist along these 
lines, while in the United States the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
3
 outlaws online 
 
2
 While this article will primarily focus on copyright infringement in the online world, there is little 
doubt that numerous areas of intellectual property rights are at issue.  See, e.g., Myriam Davidovici-Nora, 
The Dynamics of Co-Creation in the Video Game Industry: The Case of World of Warcraft, 73 COMM. & 
STRAT. 43 (2009) (exploring co-creative games); Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? 
Cybersquatting Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 301 (2005) (discussing trademark and cyber-
squatting); Mathias Klang, Avatar: From Deity to Corporate Property - A Philosophical Inquiry into 
Digital Property in Online Games, 7 INFO. COMM. & SOC. 389 (2004) (exploring virtual property); Lucille 
Ponte, Preserving Creativity from Endless Digital Exploitation: Has the Time Come for the New Concept 
of Copyright Dilution, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 34 (2009) (discussing trademark and copyright dilution); 
Mathew Rimmer, “Breakfast at Tiffany’s:” EBay Inc., Trade Mark Law and Counterfeiting, 21 J. L. INFO. 
& SCI. 128 (2011) (exploring the liability of online auction-houses for counterfeiting); Jason Schultz & 
Jennifer Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: A New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and 
Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012) (arguing for a greater use of patent protections in 
the online world); Andrew Sellars, Seized Sites: The in Rem Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain 
Names (May 8, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1835604 (arguing against the use of domain name 




 See generally ORIN KERR, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, CATO 
INSTITUTE, (Adam Thierer & Warne Crews eds., 2002) (arguing for the realization that there is a logic to 
the organization and approaches contained within the DMCA); Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Catch 
1201: A Legislative History and Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121 (2006) (examining the DMCA and circumvention technology); Edward Lee, 
Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2009) (discussing the DMCA and 
corresponding safe harbor protections); Miquel Peguera, When the Cached Link is the Weakest Link: 
Search Engine Caches under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 589 
(2009) (exploring caches under the DMCA); Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use, and Feedback: User-
Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363 (2009) (exploring user 
generated content liabilities under the DMCA); Philip I. Weiser & Gideon Parchomovsky, Beyond Fair 
Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2010) (examining fair use under the DMCA). 
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copyright infringement.  Such laws provide protections to service providers in many 
common situations, such as the service provider acting as a mere conduit, caching, or 
hosting material, provided that the ISP does not have actual knowledge of unlawful 
activity.
4
  However, by late 2010 it became clear that such protections were enabling 
service providers to entirely avoid responsibility for protecting online intellectual 
property rights.  Thus, the time was right for a fundamental shift in understanding the 
practical realities of online behavior.  Where previously it was believed that mainly 
individuals encouraged and perpetrated unlawful activity, it has become clear that 
websites can host and encourage unlawful activity, too.  Given such widespread 
infringing activity it is not surprising that ISPs have increasingly denied access to 
websites hosting protected material.  Yet doing so has required a shift in the location of 
responsibility.  Previously, intellectual property rights holders were required to carry the 
burden of both discovery and pursuit of actions against individuals perpetrating unlawful 
activity.  Today it seems the burden is shared, with the intellectual property rights holders 
required to discover illegal activity and the service provider required to enforce laws 
meant to prevent and stop it.  This shift has not gone entirely smoothly.  
¶4  The 2010 English case of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Newzbin Ltd. 
(Newzbin)
5
 is an example of the difficulties in protecting online intellectual property 
rights and the necessary shift to a shared burden.  Newzbin was a content aggregator site
6
 
that allowed users to search the Internet for locations of a specific type of file (NZB).  
Similar to a torrent,
7
 NZB files do not contain the file itself but rather information about 
the location of the file to be downloaded.  A search engine is then used to locate the file 
or series of files and once found the file can be downloaded and viewed.  The use of 
torrent and similar types of files has long been viewed as a clever way for a website to 
claim that it is not infringing copyright as the website is doing nothing more than 
providing links.  However, similar to the peer-to-peer sharing cases of A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
8
 and MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
9





 See Council Directive 2000/31, art. 12-15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) [hereinafter E-Commerce 
Directive].  
5
 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Newzbin Ltd. (Newsbin), [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch). 
6
 At the most basic level, a content aggregator is a website that collects and organizes online content 
from other sources.  It can collect information from various categories, such as news, music, videos and 
even books available online.  RSS Readers are a good basic example. 
7
 See Gaetano Dimita, Six Characters in Search Infringement: Potential Liability for Creating, 
Downloading, and Disseminating .torrent Files, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. PRAC. 466 (2012) (describing .torrent 
files). 
8
 AM Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). See Nick Scharf, Napster’s Long 
Shadow: Copyright and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. PRAC. 806 (2011) (describing the 
historical case). 
9
 MGM Studioes, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). The Grokster case is frequently 
characterized as a re-examination of the issues in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 
(1984), also known as the "Betamax case." The decision in the case ultimately protected VCR 
manufacturers from liability for contributory infringement as the court held that technology could not be 
barred if it was "capable of substantial non-infringing uses."  For a further discussion, see Rob Hof, Larry 
Lessig: Grokster Decision Will Chill Innovation, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (June 28, 2005), 
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2005/06/larry_lessig_gr.html  (discussing the 
impact of the decision to the online world); Fred von Lohmann, Remedying ‘Grokster’, LAW.COM (July 25, 
2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005544522&Remedying_Grokster (considering the need 
to work around the court decision). 
10
 The United States courts have previously faced an ISP issue eerily similar to the Newzbin and SABAM 
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film studios argued that the Newzbin site was “encouraging widespread copyright 
infringement by indexing unofficial copies of films.”11  The High Court in London 
agreed, determining that Newzbin was “liable to the claimants for infringement of their 
copyright,”12 and in March, 2010, the court ordered an injunction to restrain Newzbin 
from infringing the “claimants' copyrights in relation to their repertoire of films.”13  
Predictably, the judgment against Newzbin for copyright infringement was estimated to 
run into the millions of pounds.  As a result, Newzbin was forced to go into 
administration and the website was shut down shortly thereafter.  In this instance, an 
action against an individual and the website he operated resulted in the desired outcome, 
stopping widespread copyright infringement.  
¶5  Not surprisingly, the Newzbin case did not entirely resolve the issue.  In June, 2010, 
Newzbin came back online
14
 as Newzbin2, using the same code and database as its 
predecessor; this time, though, the website was outside the reach of the English courts as 
the website was hosted outside the United Kingdom.  As a result, the studios filed for an 
injunction in the English courts and argued that the only real means of stopping such 
widespread infringing activities within the United Kingdom was to seek an injunction 
requiring BT, a UK-based ISP, to deny access to the website Newzbin2.
15
  This request is 
fundamental and important as it asks the English courts to recognize a shared burden of 
protecting intellectual property rights. 
¶6  The Newzbin2 court did not take this task lightly and carefully considered and 
explained legislation
16
 and case law
17
 within the United Kingdom and Europe.  In the 
 
cases.  In the case of Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) the Northern District of California court found that once the plaintiff had put the defendant on notice 
of the infringing content, the act of providing the distribution of the infringement could amount to 
substantial participation.  In direct response to this potentially broad liability arising under the existing 
common law of Copyright, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act which specifically 
included a section to protect ISPs from liability provided that the ISP takes expeditious action to remove 
allegedly infringing content. 
11
 Newzbin, [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) ¶ 126. 
12
 Id.  
13
 Id. ¶ 135. 
14
 The website page notes: “The site is no longer at this location. It now operates on a different domain 
name. You can use a search engine to find it.”  When following the advice, the website is correct: it is easy 
to locate via a basic Google search-top of the list.  A quick glance of the landing page has the most recent 
episode of “The Closer” top of the list.  However, it should be noted there are episodes that are not still 
under copyright protections. (Correct as of May 19, 2012). 
15
 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecomm. PLC. (Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century 
Fox)), [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch).  In the United States, the DMCA is currently being used to block 
websites. See Susan Neuberger Weller, Copyright Owners Using DMCA To Take Down URLs, NAT’L L. 
R., (June 22, 2012), http://www.natlawreview.com.  
16
 See Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 1981 ¶¶ 75-90. 
17
 See Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 1981 ¶ 86 (citing IFPI Danmark v. Tele 2 A/S 
(Copenhagen City Court, 25 October 2006)) (order granted on application of the Danish branch of IFPI 
requiring ISP to block access to www.allofmymp3.com); SABAM v. S.A. Tiscali, Dist. Ct. Brussels No. 
04/8975/A (June 29, 2007) (order granted on application of Belgian collecting society requiring ISP to 
filter and block infringing content); IFPI Danmark v. DMT2 A/S (Bailiff’s Ct. of Frederiksberg, 5 Feb. 
2008), upheld sub nom. Sonofon A/S v. IFPI (High Court of Eastern Denmark, 26 Nov. 2008); sub nom. 
Telenor v. IFPI (Danish Supreme Court, 27 May 2010) (order granted on application of the Danish branch 
of IFPI requiring ISP to block access to www.thepiratebay.org ["the Pirate Bay"]); Bergamo Pub. 
Prosecutor's Officer v. Kolmisappi (Italian Supreme Court of Cessation, 29 Sept. 2009) (order requiring 
ISPs to block access to the Pirate Bay as part of preventative seizure in criminal proceedings); Columbia 
Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Portlane AB (Swedish Court of Appeal, 4 May 2010) (order granted on the 
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United Kingdom, “the High Court shall have power to grant an injunction against a 
service provider, where that service provider has actual knowledge of another person 
using their service to infringe copyright.”18  In making its determination, the Court is 
required to take “into account all matters which appear to it in the particular 
circumstances to be relevant,”19 including the service provider being given notice of the 
infringing activity
20
 and the level of specificity of the notice.
21
  Such legal proscriptions 
clearly place the primary burden on the rights holder to discover and then seek assistance 
to enforce unlawful activity.  But the reality of the online environment creates a dilemma 
as the rights holder is sometimes faced with a single website shifting location and widely 
encouraging unlawful behavior, thereby making a high level of specificity unlikely in 
these situations.  The language of the Newzbin2 court highlights this dilemma: 
I consider that what must be shown is that the service provider has actual 
knowledge of one or more persons using its service to infringe copyright.  The 
more information the service provider has about the infringing activity, the more 
likely it is that the service provider will have actual knowledge.  Thus it may well 
be relevant to consider whether or to what extent the service provider has 
knowledge of particular copyright works (or at least classes of copyright works) 
being involved, of particular restricted acts (or at least types of restricted act) 
being committed and of particular persons (or at least groups of persons) 
committing those acts; but it is not essential to prove actual knowledge of a 
specific infringement of a specific copyright work by a specific individual.
22
  
¶7  Consequently, it can be argued that while actual knowledge of infringing activity is 
required, there is no requirement to connect the dots and demonstrate that individual X 
downloaded movie Y protected by the copyright owned by movie studio Z.  Instead, it 
could be argued that knowledge of widespread infringing activity is enough for a right 
holder to request an injunction.  Currently, it appears that widespread infringement is 
considered to occur in one of two situations: (1) when numerous individuals are 
infringing intellectual property rights, and/or (2) when numerous incidents of infringing 
activity (regardless of the number of individuals) are occurring on a website.  In practice, 
 
application of the Studios requiring ISP to block access to a tracker website associated with the Pirate Bay); 
Nordic Records Norway AS v. Telenor ASA (Borgarting Court of Appeal, 9 Feb. 2010) (application for 
preliminary injunction by various rightholders requiring ISP to cease contributing to infringements 
committed through the Pirate Bay refused, Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive not having 
been specifically implemented); Stichting Bescherming Rechten Entm’t Industrie Nederland (BREIN) v. 
Ziggo BV (District Court of the Hague, 19 July 2010) (interim injunction to block access to the Pirate Bay 
refused); EMI Records v. UPC Commc’sn Ireland Ltd. (High Court Case No. 2009/5472P, Unreported 
decision of Mr. Justice Charlton, 11 Oct. 2010) (application by rightholders against ISP for blocking 
injunction refused since no equivalent of section 97A CDPA 1988 implementing Article 8(3) of the 
Information Society Directive); Constantin Film v. UPC (Commercial Court of Austria, 13 May 2011) 
(order granted on application of two film companies requiring ISP to block www.kino.te using IP 
blocking). 
18
 The Information Society Directive was transposed into United Kingdom domestic law by the 
Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2498 (2003).  
19
 Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 1981 ¶ 86 (citing Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulations 2003, Section 97A and 191JA). 
20
 See 2003 Regulations, 97A 2(a) and 191J1 2(a). 
21
 See id. at 97A 2(b) and 191J1 2(b). 
22
 Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 1981 ¶ 148. 
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this means that a rights holder could discover a website with a high level of ongoing 
infringement even without a high level of specificity in relation to the identity of the 
individual or the identification of the files being illegally downloaded.  Apparently, the 




¶8  This was a critical juncture.  Once the court recognized that the level of actual 
knowledge relates only to widespread infringement on a specific website, the court is 
faced with a reality of online activity: that service providers are currently in the best 
position to assist in preventing copyright infringement.
24
  This fundamental shift has 
occurred for two reasons.  First, intellectual property holders’ rights were being infringed 
on a “massive scale”25 and offending websites could easily relocate.  Second, the current 
legal standard made it almost impossible for rights holders to protect their rights in the 
face of wide-scale infringement as websites and relevant information were difficult to 
discover in a quickly changing digital landscape.  Hence the court recognized that the 
standard simply had to be lowered.  As a result, the Newzbin2 (2011) court followed the 
logic and statements originating in the Information Directive,
26
 that service providers are 
well-placed to help in such situations.  Consequently, the court determined that service 
providers must “take measures which contribute to . . . preventing further infringements 
of that kind.”27  In this instance, High Court of England and Wales determined that 
Internet service providers can assist in the prevention of further infringement activities by 
blocking its United Kingdom customers’ access to the website Newzbin2.28   
 
23
 The original Newzbin (2010) case, in which the court was also asked to shut down the website, focused 
on the uncertainty arising from the large amount of “unknowns”: “[I] do not believe it would be appropriate 
to grant an injunction of the breadth sought by the claimants for a number of reasons.  First, it is apparent 
from the terms of Directive 2001/29/EC that it is contemplating the grant of an injunction upon the 
application of rights holders, yet the claimants are seeking an injunction to restrain activities in relation to 
all binary and all text materials in respect of which they own no rights and about which I have heard little 
or no evidence.  Second, I do not accept that the defendant has actual knowledge of other persons using its 
service to infringe all such rights.  Therefore I am not persuaded I have the jurisdiction to grant such an 
injunction in any event.  Third, the rights of all other rights holders are wholly undefined and consequently 
the scope of the injunction would be very uncertain.” Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 
1981 ¶ 151 (citing Newzbin, [2010] EWHC 608 ¶ 135).  
24
 “In the digital environment, in particular, the services of intermediaries may increasingly be used by 
third parties for infringing activities.  In many cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such 
infringing activities to an end.”  Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, OJ L (L167) 10, 15 (EC). 
25
 Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1981 ¶ 185. 
26
 See id. ¶ 155 (citing Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 23 (EC); and E-Commerce 
Directive, supra note 5, at Art. 18). 
27
See generally Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1981 ¶ 156. The court was 
basing its opinion on the decision in the case of L'Oreal SA & Ors v. Bellure NV & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 
535, a trademark case which had several questions referred to the Court of Justice (E.U.) for guidance.  The 
landmark decision from the European Court of Justice in which the court determined that packaging will 
infringe a trade mark registration if it is designed to mimic the registered right to gain a commercial 
advantage, even if consumers do not believe that the infringing goods originate from the brand owner.  Id. ¶ 
138. 
28
This order was the first of its kind in the United Kingdom and has led to a quick series of requests by 
industry.  At the current time, Sky has also blocked access to Newzbin, stating: "We have received a court 
order requiring us to block access to this illegal website, which we did on 13th December, 2011." Our 
Vol. 11:5] Anjanette H. Raymond 
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¶9  Based on the Newzbin cases, one could argue that in the United Kingdom an ISP 
can be served with an injunction to shut down a website if the ISP has actual knowledge 
of widespread infringing activity, as demonstrated by either: (1) a large number of 
individuals, albeit not clearly identified, illegally downloading or uploading materials, 
and/or (2) a large number of illegally obtained files being uploaded or downloaded on a 
single website.  According to the Newzbin2 court, such an order can be given even if it is 
unclear who or what owns the rights being infringed and even if some right holders are 
not present or represented in the court action.
29
  The court has taken no issue with the 
blocking of these types of websites most likely because the illegal behavior associated 
with the website is so widespread.  However, the court’s insistence that a service provider 
must “contribute to the prevention of further infringements” left many wondering about 
the full scope of what an Internet service provider must do to “contribute” to the 
prevention of intellectual property rights infringement. 
III. THE SABAM BALANCING SCALES 
¶10  The declaration of a court that an Internet service provider must “contribute” to the 
prevention of intellectual property infringements led to widespread confusion among the 
online community and to a flurry of activity on the part of intellectual property right 
holders requesting that service providers undertake policing activities.  The SABAM case 
presented, for the first time, an opportunity for the ECJ to weigh in on the requirement 
that service providers contribute to the protection of intellectual property rights.  
¶11  The SABAM case arose from an expected dilemma for ISPs: is it an ISP’s 
responsibility to discover and prevent users from accessing services that assist in 
copyright infringing activities?  It is important to note that some commentators and 
industry researchers describe the scale of loss associated with online piracy as frankly 
staggering.
30
  While those outside the music and movie industry refute some of the 
 
Approach to Protecting Copyright, SKY NEWS, http://www.sky.com/helpcentre/broadband/protecting-
copyright/ (last visited 8/11/12).  Two of the other popular internet providers within the United Kingdom, 
Virgin Media and TalkTalk, have also been asked by the Motion Picture Association to block access to 
Newzbin.  Both have indicated that they would do so in response to a court order.  See Sky, Virgin Media 
Asked to Block Piracy Site Newzbin2, BBC ONLINE (Nov 9, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
15653434.  In one of the most recent blocking orders, in April of 2012 the English High Court issued an 
order to Sky, Everything Everywhere, TalkTalk, O2, and Virgin Media requiring the ISPs to prevent their 
users from accessing the website known as Pirate Bay.  See The Pirate Bay must be blocked by UK ISPs, 
Court Rules, BBC ONLINE (April 30 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17894176.  Microsoft 
Windows has voluntarily followed suit in preventing links to the Pirate Bay website from appearing in 
Messenger.  See Microsoft Windows Messenger blocks The Pirate Bay link, BBC ONLINE (March 27, 
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17524815.  It is very possible that Pirate Bay will be more 
widely blocked as the site appears to be the subject of a deepening investigation by the Swedish authorities.  
See Swedish Investigation into The Pirate Bay 'Deepens', BBC ONLINE (March 15, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17387858. 
29
 See Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1981 ¶ 148. 
30
 As the Newzbin2 court highlights: “A study by Ipsos MediaCAT dated April 2010 analyzing the scale 
of film and television piracy in the UK in 2009 estimated the overall loss from film piracy at £477 million 
and the overall loss from television piracy at £58 million.  A study by Tera Consultants dated March 2010 
concluded that in 2008 the audio and audiovisual industries in the UK lost almost 670 million euros in 
revenues to physical and digital piracy, with the larger proportion of that lost revenue attributable to digital 
piracy.” Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 1981 ¶ 20. 
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numbers concerning the scale of infringing activity,
31
 one can appreciate the reactions of 
various industries impacted by the violation of intellectual property rights.  Even if we 
assume a conservative number, it’s no surprise that ISPs are in the cross hairs of the 
music, television, and film industries, which are being bled by online piracy and claim 
that their only hope of stemming the tide is to prevent the wide-scale distribution of 
pirated material online.  Consequently, some argue, it is not merely enough to craft 
injunctions that shut down people and websites actively engaging in copyright 
infringement; it is also important to require intermediaries—such as ISPs—to take 
preventative measures.  ISPs, meanwhile, fear this argument, insisting that it will burden 
them with the frankly unrealistic duty to monitor all online activity.   
¶12  The SABAM case provides a perfect example of the dilemma that ISPs face and the 
balance that must be struck between the rights of all in the online world.  In 2004, 
SABAM
32
 discovered that subscribers to the Belgian ISP Scarlet Extended (Scarlet) were 
using the ISP's services to illegally download, through P2P networks, protected works 
from its catalogue, without authorization and without paying royalties.
33
  SABAM thus 
requested that a Belgian Court issue an injunction against Scarlet forcing it to block any 
such downloading or uploading of illegal files via P2P networks without authorization.
34
  
In June of 2007, the Brussels Court of First Instance granted the injunction and ordered 
Scarlet to ensure that no copyrighted works were downloaded.  Failing to do so would 
mean paying a daily fine.
35
  Scarlet appealed the ruling, arguing that imposing an 
obligation to monitor the activities of its users is incompatible with the E-Commerce 
directive and with fundamental rights
36
 enshrined within E.U. law.  The Brussels Appeal 
Court proceeded to ask the European Court of Justice whether E.U. law
37
 precludes an 
injunction asking an ISP to filter for copyrighted content with a view to blocking the 
transfer of those files, including the use of filters as a preventative measure.
38
  In 
responding to the question, the ECJ goes to great lengths to consider the potential conflict 
between several E.U. Directives concerning information, intermediaries, copyright rights 
holders,
39
 and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
 
31
 See, e.g., IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GROWTH (2011), cited in SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 21. 
32
 One should note I have had to rely upon the ECJ case and Newzbin2 for the basic summary. See 
SABAM, C-70/10 ¶¶ 15-28; Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 1981 ¶¶ 165-77. 
33
 See SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 17.  
34
 See id. ¶ 18. 
35
 See id. ¶ 23. 
36
 See id. ¶ 27. 
37
 See id. ¶ 28. The E.U. law being: (1) the 2000 E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5; (2) the 2001 
Directive for Copyright harmonisation, (3) the 2004 Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights, (4) the 1995 Directive on Data Protection and (5) the 2002 Directive on Data Protection in the field 
of Electronic Communications.  
38
 Reference (OJ) OJ C 113 of 01.05.2010, p.20, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=C-70/10.  
39
 See Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 (O.J. 
L 167) 10; Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 (O.J. L 157) 16; Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 (O.J. L 281) 31; Directive 2000/31 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society 
Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), 
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Fundamental Freedoms, specifically the protection of copyright and the protection of the 
fundamental rights of individuals.
40
  In making its determination, the SABAM court 
recognized two fundamental issues in relation to service providers: (1) the court affirmed 
existing E.U. case law and academic commentary placing service providers in a position 
to “cooperate” with intellectual property right holders in protecting copyright in the 
online world, and (2) it began to establish the balance that must be maintained between a 
service provider’s rights and intellectual property holder’s rights.   
¶13  In determining the parameters of this balance, the SABAM court declared: “[T]he 
protection of the fundamental right to property, which includes the rights linked to 
intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental 
rights.”41  Fortunately, the court recognized the need to be more proscriptive in such an 
evolving area of law and went on to focus on three fundamental rights within the E.U. 
that must be considered in creating the balance: (1) the right of business to conduct its 
business,
42
 (2) the right of an individual to protect personal data,
43
 and (3) the right of an 
individual to receive and impart information.
44
  Consequently, the interests of intellectual 
property rights holders must be balanced against the right of service providers to conduct 
business, the right of the individual to protect personal data, and the right of the 
individual to receive and impart information.  And because the weight of each set of 
rights shifts on a case-by-case analysis, one can imagine a scale shifting the balance 
based on the specific facts of the circumstances presented.  
¶14  Post-SABAM, the first pressing issue is what percentage of unlawful activity is 
enough to shift the SABAM balance so significantly that the intellectual property right 
holder’s interest is given prominence?  Unsurprisingly, most commentators argue that all 
of the websites previously discussed are hosting widespread copyright infringing 
activities by their users.  Consequently, the blocking of Newzbin, Newzbin2, and Pirate 
Bay sites were not controversial.  But what if the website had contained 40% non-
infringing use?  What if the number is closer to 60%?  Where is the line?  The answer, of 
course, has to be determined on a case-by-case analysis of the particulars of the websites 
and the activities of the websites users.  Clearly, 90% infringing activity by users is 
strong support for a blocking order.  However, this line is not as easy to define, as part of 
the first consideration must be in relation to the definition of what constitutes infringing 
activity.  What happens when a website has 90% of its users uploading legal material and 
only a few outliers uploading a large amount of infringing material?  Is this to be treated 
 
2000 (O.J. L 178) 1; Directive 2002/58 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic 
Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 (O.J. L 201) 37. 
40
 See Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, 10, Nov. 4, 
1950 (as amended June 1, 2010). 
41
 SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 44.  
42
 See id. ¶ 46 (citing Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 16, 200 O.J. (C 364) 1, 
12). 
43
 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8 200 O.J. (C 364) 1, 10 (“Everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her”); id. at 11 (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”). 
44
 E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5 at 6. (The recitals to the E-Commerce Directive note, “the 
removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of 
expression.”). 
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the same as a website with many users infringing copyright?  The answer is no.  A 
website with only a few members uploading and/or downloading a large amount of 
infringing material should be attacked via action against the individuals.  Websites should 
only be shut down when a large number of individual users are perpetrating a large 
amount of illegal activity.  Without this restriction, the original laws designed to prevent 
individual users from widespread infringement are superfluous.  Moreover, the 
overzealous use of this new method of attack may result in curbing legal and lawful uses 
in relation to the sharing of information online.   
¶15  Concerning the burden that an Internet service provider45 must undertake to 
cooperate in the protections, courts have already established several important factors to 
be considered in the shifting balance.  In a similar manner to the telephone company, 
Internet service providers should not be expected to undertake general monitoring of its 
customers’ behavior.46  Even in a situation where monitoring activities become less 
costly,
47
 an ISP should not be expected to be anything more than a provider of a 
communications service that is in a position to help, but should not be burdened by, the 
assertion of intellectual property rights.  Thus far, courts have considered the following 
factors relevant to determining the burden ISPs should bear: cost of implementation,
48
 
cost associated with upkeep, cost associated with monitoring,
49
 level of data inspection 
required,
50
 complexity of the system to be installed,
51
 duration of the request,
52
 and the 
technical feasibility of such a request.
53
  Internet service providers cannot be asked to 
implement a system that monitors all information,
54
 for an unlimited time,
55
 at the 
 
45
 Other courts have considered a different balance.  For example, in the U.S., Judge Posner used a cost-
and-benefit analysis when considering the service provider’s role in the protection of intellectual property 
rights.  In the case of In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, Judge Posner set forth a “disproportionately 
costly” test, stating: “[I]f the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer 
the provider of the service must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate 
or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses.”  In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 653 
(7th Cir. 2003). 
46
 The Court in L'Oreal SA & Ors v. Bellure NV & Ors specified that national measures which require an 
intermediary provider, such as an ISP, to actively monitor all the data of each of its customers in order to 
prevent any future infringement of intellectual-property rights violates this general monitoring provision.  
See L'Oreal SA & Ors, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535 ¶ 139 (citing Directive 2004/48, Article 3 (2)). 
47
 The SABAM court specifies that even in the face of less costly measures, the balance would still not 
tip in favor of requiring ISPs to monitor customers’ online activity.  As the court highlights: the injunction 
would “require the ISP to carry out general monitoring, something which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of 
Directive 2000/31.”  SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 40. 
48
 See id. ¶ 48. 
49
 The Court highlights the installation of the filtering system would require that ISP to “install a 
complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own expense.” Id. ¶ 48.   
49
 See id. at ¶ 47.  
50
 See Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC (Ch) 1981 ¶ 162. 
51
 The Court emphasizes that the implementation of such a system would also be contrary to the 
conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48 which requires that measures to ensure the 
respect of intellectual-property rights should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly.  See SABAM, C-
70/10 ¶ 36 (citing L'Oreal SA & Ors, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535 ¶ 139). 
52
 The Court seems unwilling to expect an intermediary to undertake such an expense when the 
“monitoring has no limitation in time, is directed at all future infringements and is intended to protect not 
only existing works, but also future works that have not yet been created at the time when the system is 
introduced.” See SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 47. 
53
 See id. 
54
 See id. 
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exclusive cost of the ISP.
56
  Such a general order would place an undue burden on service 
providers that should be considered a significant barrier to the operations of the service 
providers’ business.57  However, a specific, targeted, and precise injunction requiring the 
use of an existing technology to monitor behavior is a reasonable burden.
58
   
¶16  One is left to wonder, however, if the court-prescribed balance between intellectual 
rights holders, businesses, and customers can be adequately accomplished when the 
filtering or blocking mechanism employed “over captures” lawful content59 and, in doing 
so, over burdens the rights of individuals.  The ECJ highlights that blocking lawful 
activity might undermine the freedom of information protections enshrined in the E.U. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art 11)
60
 by preventing individuals from accessing their 
lawfully created and owned information, communications of personal videos.
61
  And 
because over capturing impacts individuals in this manner, individuals and their rights are 
an important part of the balance that courts must begin to consider.  This issue may be 
precisely what the SABAM court was intending to highlight: what happens when the 
system over captures customers’ communications such that lawful activity and 
information is now blocked.
62
  This issue is highlighted by the attorneys for Kyle 
Goodwin in United States v. Kim Dotcom and Megaupload Limited
63
 (Megaupload): 
It is one thing to take legal action against an alleged copyright infringer.  It is 
quite another to do so at the expense of entirely innocent third parties, with no 
attempt to prevent or even mitigate the collateral damage.
64
 
As noted by Goodwin’s attorney, the problem of over capturing is exacerbated as the law 
does not provide for protections of individuals’ information or communications.  
 
55
 See id.  
56
 See id. ¶ 48. The Court emphasizes that the implementation of such as system would also be contrary 
to the conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure the 
respect of intellectual-property rights should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly. Id. 
57
 See id. ¶ 47-48. 
58
 Newzbin2 (Twentieth Century Fox), [2011] EWHC 1981 ¶ 177. 
59
 See SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 52. 
60
 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 11, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
61
 The ECJ emphasizes that ISP customers are guaranteed the freedom to receive and impart 
information.  Filtering mechanisms, such as those described in this case, might not adequately distinguish 
between unlawful content and lawful content.  The practical result of such an implementation is the 
blocking of lawful communications.  See SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 52. 
62
 See SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 52. 
63
See Indictment, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2012-01-05-Indictment.pdf.  The term Megaupload 
is being used in this article as it is the most recognizable name used in the media.  However, the 
“conspiracy” involved numerous other websites and, of course, several named individuals.  The Los 
Angeles Times has produced numerous stories on the topic and has a full version of the court indictment.  
See, e.g., Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Justice Department Indictment of MegaUpload, LOS ANGELES TIMES 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://documents.latimes.com/justice-department-ndictment-file-sharing-site-megaupload/. 
64
 Brief of Interested Party Kyle Goodwin at 1, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 
2012), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/MegauploadMotion-1.pdf.  See also, 
Greg Sandoval, U.S. Tries to Silence MegaUpload Lawyers on Issue of User Data, CNET NEWS (April 13, 
2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57413506-93/u.s-tries-to-silence-megaupload-lawyers-on-issue-
of-user-data/; David Kravets, Judge Won’t Purge Megaupload User Data, At Least Not Yet, WIRED (April 
13, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/04/megaupload-data-flap/. 
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Although the U.S. does provide such protections when an individual’s 
information/communication is removed from a website,
65
 no law in the E.U. or U.S. 
provides protections in the event that an entire website is blocked.
66
  Consequently, in the 
absence of legal proscriptions, the courts must craft ways to protect the lawful 
information and/or communications captured within a shut-down/block order.  At a 
minimum one would expect that the shutdown order would require: (1) that a filtering or 
similar system be set up to remove from the block and return to the rightful owner any 
information/contents or communications that are clearly not the subject of an intellectual 
property rights holder claim against the website/user, (2) a provision for the individual 
that stored or transmitted the information to demonstrate that the contents are of a lawful 
use/activity, and (3) the safekeeping of the information until any issues are resolved. 
Balance is struck in these instances only when information is protected and when 
retrieval of lawful information is possible. 
¶17  If European law better handled the over-capturing issue, would the SABAM balance 
place less of an emphasis upon the rights of the individuals and their lawfully stored 
information?  If these protections existed, either through E.U. action or individual court 
action, one could argue that the over-capturing issue would be less significant within the 
SABAM balance.  In fact, it is easy to imagine the elimination of the concerns in relation 
to individuals and the protection of their information that currently takes a high level of 
prominence within the SABAM balance considerations. 
¶18  Moreover, returning to the issue of cost in relation to the captured 
information/communications, it is reasonable that any court order blocking a website 
would require the website’s host to bear the cost of setting up a system that filters out 
users’ lawful information and the cost of storing legal information while the dispute is 
resolved.  But again, as this is an unresolved issue, the law fails to fully flesh out the cost 
burden of storing and protecting information.  The Megaupload court in the U.S. is 
currently considering this issue.
67
  Meanwhile, as legislation seeks to catch up with the 
 
65
 The DMCA provides specific protections in relation to individuals’ disabled or removed information, 
including rights in relation to challenging such removal, under the concept known as counter-notice.  See 
generally Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 233 (2009) (discussing 
the use of safe harbor protections); Lydia Pallas Loren, Deterring Abuse of the Copyright Takedown 
Regime by Taking Misrepresentation Claims Seriously, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745 (2011) (determining 
that copyright owners obtain prompt removal of infringing material from the Internet without judicial 
assessment of the assertion of infringement); Ira S. Nathenson, Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA's Safety 
Dance, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 121 (2009); Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their 
European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 
(2009) (comparing U.S. to European law).   
66
 Interestingly, India has recently clarified a prior order which seemingly required ISPs to block the 
well-known website “Pirate Bay.”  In June, the Madras High Court of India clarified the order to block the 
site, stating: “[T]he interim injunction is granted only in respect of a particular URL where the infringing 
movie is kept and not in respect of the entire website.” India Unblocks the Pirate Bay and Other Sharing 
Sites, BBC (June 22, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18551471. 
67
 See Kravets, Megaupload User Data, supra note 65; David Kravets, Retired Judge Joins Fight 
Against DOJ’s ‘Outrageous’ Seizures in Megaupload Case, WIRED (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/retired-judge-megaupload/; Megaupload User Asks Court to 
Return His Video Files, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 30, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/megaupload-user-asks-court-return-his-video-files; Jacob L. Rogers, 
U.S. v. Kim Dotcom: Government Says Megaupload Users Must Pay to Retrieve Their Data, JOLT DIGEST, 
(June 18, 2012, 6:48 AM), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/copyright/u-s-v-kim-dotcom; Greg Sandoval, 
EFF to Federal Court: Return MegaUpload Data Now, CNET (May 25, 2012, 9:32 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57441702-93/eff-to-federal-court-return-megaupload-data-now/; 
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evolving case law, courts should consider the balance of costs associated with the 
protection of legal data and should pass on costs associated with the storage and 
maintenance to the offending website hosts.  The courts must seek to achieve the balance. 
¶19  In summation, to achieve the SABAM balance requires the availability of 
technology that is not too costly to monitor, install, or maintain.  There would also have 
to be mechanisms put in place to protect information stored on a website when it is being 
blocked.  Additionally, achieving the SABAM balance would require a system to filter 
lawful material and return it to its owner in a timely manner and to ensure the law abiding 
users of a website to resolve issues in a timely manner.  Finally, legal information would 
need to be maintained while all of these issues were resolved.  Few of these mechanisms 
or protections currently exist.  Consequently, the SABAM balance is much more difficult 
to achieve then it may appear at first blush. 
IV. ONGOING PROBLEMS 
¶20  The SABAM decision has raised more questions than it has provided answers.  
However, the case did achieve clarity in relation to one pressing issue: namely, that 
service providers must cooperate in protecting intellectual property rights but may not be 
overburdened by this requirement.  Unfortunately, many of the unresolved issues will 
cause ongoing problems.  In fact, some of the SABAM court’s resolutions may have 
created more problems in this fast moving area of law.   
A. Adherence to the Prescribed Balance is Not the Answer 
¶21  The court in SABAM used a traditional legal prescription to resolve the issues it 
faced, namely the need to balance fundamental rights between three parties: the 
intellectual property right holders, individuals and business (ISPs).
68
  But such a balance 
seems to suggest in most instances that the various positions must be in conflict with one 
another.  This is an odd thought concerning fundamental rights. If we think of intellectual 
property rights and other fundamental rights as balanced on a scale, a loss in the 
fundamental rights side is ipso facto a gain for the other side.  However, in light of the 
various cases discussed above, should a balance be required at all?  In a large majority of 
the situations, there is no conflict between rights and thus a balance is not the appropriate 
standard to be used within the courts consideration.  For example, in the case that an 
individual illegally downloads a copy of the final episode of Desperate Housewives, the 
individual knows the action is copyright infringement but fails to appreciate this action as 
theft of another’s property.69  The individual has no right in the intellectual property and 
is owed no considerations of balance in relation to the illegal online activity.  The 
 
Sandoval, U.S. Tries to Silence MegaUpload Lawyers, supra note 65. 
68
See SABAM, C-70/10.  
69
 See Oliver Goodenough & Greg Decker, Why Do Good People Steal Intellectual Property?, 14-15 in 
THE GRUTER INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS ON LAW, ECONOMICS, AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (Vol. 4 
2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/giwp/default/vol4/iss1/art3 (arguing that the different attitudes 
towards intellectual and tangible property are due to an insufficient affective component to the 
understanding of intellectual property rights with most people); Alexander Peukert, Why Do “Good 
People” Disregard Copyright on the Internet?, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, (Christophe Geiger ed., forthcoming Dec. 2012) (manuscript 
at 14) (“digital sharing is an everyday practice by millions of people, and in that sense normal”). 
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individual justifies his actions by claiming that copyright law has failed to keep up with 
the online world and needs reform, or that everyone is doing it,
70
 or he rationalizes his 
actions as appropriate because it is the fault of the various industries for not 
understanding the demands of their customers.
71
  There is no need to balance; the 
individual has no right to download or upload information or communications that are not 
identified by the law as belonging to him regardless of his justifications or 
rationalizations of his illegal activity.  While naysayers may insist that copyright law 
must be reformed (they are right)
72
 and that the entertainment industry must respond to 
users’ appetite for quick and reasonably priced access to music and movies (also right),73 
current law prohibits downloading or uploading information that is protected by another’s 
intellectual property rights.  The individual should seek to change the law in relation to 
intellectual property, but violations of the law should not be entertained, nor are the 
activities deserving of considerations of the need to balance rights amongst parties.   
¶22  In the case that an Internet service provider or other entity denies an individual or 
business access to its lawfully created material, such as in the Megaupload case, the 
online entity is in violation of the law.  The information and communication belongs to 
the individual.  Denying the individual or business access to its personally created Word 
document or video is an infringement of the individual’s fundamental property right.74  
Again, there is no need to balance the rights; the rights are clear and do not conflict.   
¶23  In terms of the potential to consider a service provider’s right to conduct business 
as an area to be balanced against the intellectual property holder rights, again this is 
ultimately not resolved through the use of creating a balance.  Like any other business in 
the E.U., a service provider has a right to conduct business, but only when doing so does 
not enable or promote unlawful activity.  There are no balance considerations necessary.  
Instead, the question is how much burden is reasonable for an Internet service provider to 
undertake when faced with the illegal activity of its customers. 
B. Overburdening Internet Service Providers is Not the Answer 
¶24  ISPs have a fundamental right to operate their business without an undue burden.  
But what constitutes an undue burden?  As the courts continue to struggle with this 
question on a case-by-case basis, some wonder if the burden of protecting intellectual 
property rights placed on service providers should include considerations of the high 
volume of activity being requested to protect intellectual property rights.   
 
70
 See John Palfrey, Urs Gasser, Miriam Simun & Rosalie Fay Barnes, Youth, Creativity, and Copyright 
in the Digital Age, INT’L J. OF LEARNING AND MEDIA 79, 87 (2009).  
71
 Id. at 89. Another theory is one of moral disengagement, where individual “users reconstruct their 
conduct as having a moral purpose in order to make it socially acceptable.” Peukert, supra note 70 
(manuscript at 16). 
72
 See, e.g., Stacy Baird, Contentious Issues: Copyright Reforms in the Age of Digital Technologies 1 
(Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520161 (“Copyright holders and users of 
copyrighted works alike believe changes to copyright law are imperative to maintain the social benefits of 
copyright law.”). 
73




 See supra notes 61-63 and corresponding text. 
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¶25  British Telecommunication (BT) estimates that the court order to block the 
Newzbin website cost £5,000 (U.S. $7,865) to implement.
75
  While this may seem a small 
cost in light of BT’s annual earnings,76 it is not a cost BT should bear.  Moreover, this is 
the cost for a single implementation of a website blocking order.  Should the courts 
consider the burden in a more “big picture” holistic manner?  In other words, should the 
courts consider not only the cost of a single event but rather consider the totality of all 
activities that a service provider must undertake to protect intellectual property rights?  If 
BT has a fundamental right to not have its business unduly burdened, surely a holistic 
approach is necessary as it is only in this light that the true nature of the burden becomes 
apparent.  The creation of a holistic burden approach demands that courts consider the 
entire burden of requiring ISPs to protect intellectual property rights.  One such burden is 
intellectual property right holders’ “take down” requests.  Consider the statements made 
by Verizon Communications: 
While Verizon receives valid “notice and takedown” requests from copyright 
owners and responds promptly with the “take down” and counter-notification 
processes, we have unfortunately also experienced increasing misuses of the 
Designated Agent information located on the Copyright Office’s website.  The 
misuses fall into a variety of categories, including cases of (i) P2P and other file 
sharing activities where the material alleged to be infringed does not reside on a 
service provider’s system or network, yet ISPs are often sent automated 
“takedown” notices by the thousands; (ii) allegations of trademark infringement, 
where the DMCA “notice and takedown” provision does not apply; (iii) material 
that is protected by the “fair use” defense of the Copyright Act; and (iv) abusive 
litigation tactics made in the alarming growth of “copyright troll” lawsuits.
77
   
¶26  In other words, ISPs are being inundated with take down requests, some legitimate 
and some clearly nothing more than nefarious attempts to restrict the use of material or to 
catch ISPs without timely take down response procedures.
78
  Some of these issues are 
distinguishable from the issue at hand, as the requests Verizon notes are not in response 
to a court order but a mere “good faith” request to remove copyrighted material.  Yet it is 
still worth asking: in examining the proper degree of burden placed on a business, 
shouldn’t a holistic consideration include the entirety of the burden placed on ISPs to 
protect online intellectual property rights?  
 
75
 See Rich Trenholm, Newzbin BT ban demanded for Sky, Virgin Media and TalkTalk, CNET, (Nov 9, 
2011, 5:19 PM), http://crave.cnet.co.uk/software/newzbin-bt-ban-demanded-for-sky-virgin-media-and-
talktalk-50006004/. 
76
 BT’s earnings were estimated at over 1.8 billion in 2012. See Annual Financials For BT Group, 
PLC ADS, MARKET WATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/bt/financials (last visited Dec. 
1, 2012). 
77
 Sarah B. Deutsch, Re: Request for Public Comment on Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of 
Claimed Infringement, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE 2 (Nov. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/comments/2011/initial/verizon.pdf. See also Ke Steven Wan, 
Managing Peer-to-Peer Traffic with Digital Fingerprinting and Digital Watermarking, 41 SW. L. REV. 331 
(2012) (arguing that the graduated response system will aggravate the misuse of the notice-and-takedown 
procedure and strengthen the content industry’s control over content).  
78
 See Nathenson, supra note 66, at 168.  
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¶27  Taken together, court orders and “good faith” take-down requests create an unfair 
burden for ISPs as the cost alone is prohibitive.
79
  These requirements grate against the 
original idea of copyright holders bearing the burden of identification and enforcement 
costs in protecting intellectual property rights.
80
  No amount of court ordered 
“cooperation” should shift the burden or protect intellectual property rights to such a 
large extent.  This fundamental shift redistributes the burden of protecting intellectual 
property rights to the ISP, which, in the long run, may overtake a large portion of the time 
commitments of the ISP, add undue cost, and may effectively shut down some ISPs 
and/or websites.   
¶28  Moreover, one can appreciate that the rise in take down requests is a likely result of 
an inefficient and unsuccessful law that requires constant court intervention to stop 
widespread copyright infringement.  Without a level of clarity and legal reform in the 
area of online intellectual property rights it is easy to imagine an increase in take-down, 
shut-down, and removal requests.  The system is sagging at the seams and one of the 
parties bearing a large part of the burden of policing and responding to intellectual 
property rights holders’ concerns is service providers.  The balance has fundamentally 
shifted, more than the SABAM court could have ever imagined or considered in light of 
the case before it.  The sheer weight of the activity being required of service providers to 
police the Internet for copyright infringement should be considered an undue burden.   
C. Ongoing and Continuous Court Involvement is Not a Long-Term Solution 
¶29  Currently, European Union Member States have differing laws concerning 
copyrighted works, especially relating to statutory exceptions to copyright.  For example, 
some Member States classify certain works as falling within the public domain,
81
 while 
others allow works to be posted online free of charge
82
 with little concern to copyright 
protections.  The fact that E.U. law remains fragmented on copyright issues is a concern 
of service providers, as highlighted by the SABAM court: 
Indeed, it is not contested that the reply to the question whether a transmission is 
lawful also depends on the application of statutory exceptions to copyright which 
vary from one Member State to another.
83
   
¶30  The perplexities of legal protections are just as diverse among all jurisdictions.84  
For example, Canada is in the midst of reforming its copyright laws;
85
 the European 
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 See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1392 (2010) (“If ISPs were to fully 
investigate the potential infringing activities, the costs of such investigation could be prohibitive.”). 
80
 See Anna Katz, Copyright In Cyberspace: Why Owners Should Bear The Burden Of Identifying 
Infringing Materials Under The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 18.2 (2012) 
(discussing the DMCA and the burdens assumed within the creation of protections). 
81
 See SABAM, C-70/10 ¶ 52. 
82




 See e.g., Peguera, supra note 66, at 481. 
85
 For a broad discussion of the new Canadian Bill C-11 (Copyright Reform), see Michael Geist, 
Conclusion Of Copyright Debate Leaves Many Unanswered Questions, THESTAR.COM (May 26, 2012), 
http://www.thestar.com/business/article/1196810--conclusion-of-copyright-debate-leaves-many-
unanswered-questions. 
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Commission plans to examine procedures used to take down copyright-infringing and 
other illegal content from websites;
86
 Germany has criminalized copyright 
infringement;
87
 Norwegian copyright protections are limited by privacy rights;
88
 and the 
United States stands ready to go to great lengths to protect intellectual property rights,
89
 
even through the application of criminal law.  Given this complexity, it is not surprising 
that service providers insist upon a court order, as the potential of liability arising from 
misreading or misunderstanding these complex areas of law will subject the ISPs to 
liability from all parties concerned.   
¶31  But mere court involvement may not be enough, as noted by the 108 law professors 
in their letter to Congress entitled “Letter in Opposition to ‘Preventing Real Online 
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 
(PROTECT IP Act).’”90  The language of the PROTECT IP Act requires Internet service 
providers to refuse to recognize Internet domain names that a court considers “dedicated 
to infringing activities.”91  While a noble and appropriate goal, the Act allowed courts, 
with nothing more than a temporary restraining order and without the requirement of a 
basic hearing, to order any Internet service provider to stop recognizing sites.  It is easy to 
understand why ISPs would find this worrisome.  Shutting down a website should require 
court involvement and not just a mere application to the court.   
¶32  The Protect IP Act, in an attempt to react quickly to a widespread infringing 
activity occurring on various websites, has compromised the due process rights of service 
providers, online users, and the online community as a whole.  Such willingness to 
circumvent due process is an example of the extreme measures being proposed to react to 
a fast-evolving online world.  If such legislation is to be promulgated as a response to the 
speed required to effectively shut down websites that promote copyright infringement, 
the courts must be involved to protect due process considerations.  However, court 
involvement—even under the Protect IP Act—is expensive and takes time.  Copyright 
 
86
 In making this announcement, the European Commission noted that this public consultation is part of 
a much larger new e-commerce action plan.  The new plan will examine everything from copyright to the 
basics of e-commerce and cyber security in an effort to “doubl[e] the share of e-commerce in retail sales 
(currently 3.4 percent) and that of the internet sector in European GDP (currently less than three percent) 
by 2015.” Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Coherent Framework for Building Trust in the Digital 
Single Market for E-commerce and Online Services, COM (2011) 942 final (Jan. 11, 2012). 
87
 Although, in the case of an individual, non-commercial or small scale infringement of the law is not 
enforced. See Peukert, supra note 70 (Manuscript at 4). 
88
 This is contentious in many EU jurisdictions. See generally Baird, Contentious Issue, supra note 73.  
In fact, Norwegian Minister of Education, Bård Vegar Solhjell, wrote on his personal blog that non-
commercial file-sharing should be legalized in Norway and a blanket license scheme should be set up so 
creators are paid; writing that there is “no future in fighting” file-sharing services.  Bård Vegar Solhjell, 
Lovleg fildeling med Tono-avgift, (file sharing with a fee), BLOG OF BÅRD VEGAR SOLHJELL (February 18, 
2009), http://www.bardvegar.no/2009/02/lovleg-fildelingmed-tono-avgift, cited and translated in Baird, 
supra note 73, at 53. 
89
 See Megaupload discussion, supra note 64 and corresponding text.  
90
 Professors’ Letter in Opposition to “Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft 
of Intellectual Property Act of 2011” to members of the United States Congress (July 5, 2011), available at 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/newsfeed/files/2011/07/PROTECT-IP-letter-final.pdf. See Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (PROTECT IP Act of 
2011), S. 968, 112 Cong. (2011). 
91
 See Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 
2011 (PROTECT IP Act of 2011), S. 968, 112 Cong. §3(b)(1), (2011). 
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holders have long complained that the “cost of seeking a blocking injunction under 
existing legislation is . . . prohibitive for all but the largest copyright owners.”92  And 
there are few alternatives, as service providers would subject themselves to liability for 
not insisting upon a court order.  Clearly, court involvement is a necessary evil of the 
current system.  But one must wonder if the system will ever actually achieve the goal of 
preventing—or even reducing—online infringing activity, given the cost and time 
involved with going to court. 
D. Criminalizing the Service Provider is Not the Answer 
¶33  The case of United States v. Kim Dotcom and Megaupload Limited93 provides the 
clearest guidance to the U.S. position on websites that host ongoing and widespread 
infringing activities.
94
  Megaupload is one of a series of websites owned by the now 
infamous Kim “Dotcom” Schmitz that allows customers to upload content into a cyber-
locker.  Various other Mega websites allowed everything from video streaming to online 
music storage.
95
  Needless to say, the various websites were allegedly used to upload and 
stream material that was not appropriately licensed.  Although Megaupload is a Hong 
Kong-based company, its web hosting company, Carpathia, is located in Virginia.
96
  The 
physical location of a web hosting service in Virginia arguably gives the Virginia court 
jurisdiction over Megaupload activities related to storage and use of its server.  
Responding to what was viewed as widespread copyright infringing activities in the 
United States, the Justice Department seized several of the websites.
97
  The five-count 
indictment, which alleges criminal copyright infringement as well as conspiracy to 
commit money laundering and racketeering,
98
 described a site “designed specifically to 
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 Site Blocking to Reduce Online Copyright Infringement: A Review of Sections 17 and 18 of the Digital 
Economy Act, OFCOM, 6 (May 27, 2010), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-
blocking.pdf.  In fact, substantial research exists in this area, focusing on the criminal statutes and 
corresponding effect of implementation and enforcement in Germany. See, Peukert, supra note 70. 
93
 See Indictment, supra note 64. 
94
 Megaupload is the most notorious, but not the only, website that has been seized in this manner.  See, 
e.g., Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), New York Investigators Seize 10 
Websites That Illegally Streamed Copyrighted Sporting And Pay-Per-View Events (Feb 2, 2011), available 
at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110202newyork.htm. 
95
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation seized the Web site Megaupload and 18 domain names that 
formed Megaupload’s network of file-sharing sites. See Ben Sisario, 7 Charged as F.B.I. Closes a Top 
File-Sharing Site, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/indictment-
charges-megaupload-site-with-piracy.html?_r=0. 
96
 See Sandoval, supra note 65. 
97
 See FBI Anti-Piracy Warning, http://megaupload.com/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).  This is the most 
drastic of measures. In fact, in the United States, the DMCA is currently being used to block websites.  See 
Weller, supra note 16.  
98
 The indictment lists five criminal counts, all related to the underlying allegation of criminal copyright 
infringement. In addition to criminal copyright infringement (17 U.S.C. § 506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319), the 
indictment alleges conspiracy to commit racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1962) by being engaged in an enterprise 
to commit criminal copyright infringement, conspiracy to commit money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956) by 
transferring money that constituted the proceeds of criminal copyright infringement, and aiding and 
abetting criminal copyright infringement (18 U.S.C. § 2).  The indictment alleges that Megaupload did not 
designate a copyright agent, as is required under the "safe harbor" of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
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was based.   
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reward users who uploaded pirated content for sharing, and turned a blind eye to requests 
from copyright holders to remove copyright-protected files.”99  The result was a far-
reaching indictment that effectively shut down Megaupload.com.  The Megaupload case 
is just beginning to move through the courts, but four things should be noted: (1) criminal 
law was applied, (2) the law has yet to fully flesh out the use of criminal law in this 
manner, (3) this type of “international” criminal action is incredibly controversial,100 and 
(4) the Department of Justice and the court have both intimated that the services hosting 
Megaupload sites may be the next entity pursued.
101
   
¶34  Megaupload calls attention to several concerns relating to the use of criminal law to 
protect online intellectual property rights. The negative fury over the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA)
102
 highlights issues raised in relation to criminalization of 
activities of both ordinary users and third-party service providers.  Although complaints 
and concerns about the Agreement are legion,
103
 for the purpose of this paper I will focus 
on service providers.  The current draft of ACTA eliminates provisions concerning the 
criminalization of both ordinary users and service providers.
104
  The elimination of these 
provisions once considered essential to the Act is a key issue, as the removal of criminal 
law as a deterrent to infringing activity demonstrates strong and widespread disagreement 
amongst the drafters of the Act.  Drafters clearly can find no consensus when determining 
the use of criminal sanctions against both individual users and service providers.  
Allowing either of these parties to be characterized as criminals or accomplices to 
criminal activity, without evidence of knowledge or willful participation in infringing 
activities, does not accomplish the end goal of reducing copyright infringing activity.  
Rather, it criminalizes an entire generation of Internet users, places too high of a burden 
on service providers, and ultimately impacts the manner in which Internet service 
providers operate.  While this paper is not intended to focus on the need to protect 
individuals, criminalization of individual users has an impact on service providers.  One 
could argue that criminalizing individual users will impact service providers because a 
service provider’s failure to cooperate in the rooting out of online criminals may subject 
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100
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the service provider to liability.  Thus, one could argue that neither individuals nor 
service providers should be criminalized. 
¶35  Unfortunately, the SABAM courts failed to discuss the necessary balance between 
copyright protections predating and existing within the digital age.  The absence of a 
realistic balance leaves service providers unprotected as they seek to navigate widely 
differing laws.  In his 2007 TED Talk,
105
 noted Professor Lawrence Lessig claims that the 
digital age has allowed the younger generations to re-engage in the creation of culture via 
the use of digital technology.  However, as highlighted by Lessig, such re-engagement is 
stifled by current copyright laws that protect almost any use of copyrighted material 
without permission.  Currently, copyright laws are simply ignored in many settings.  
Maybe the SABAM court should have considered the balance between the need to protect 
intellectual property holder rights and the creative interests designed to be protected in 
the original copyright protection laws.  Current permutations of the law provide for little 
balance between these rights and instead place prohibitive restrictions upon the creative 
processes.  The absence of balance requires service providers to police online traffic for 
violations based in physical world realities or potentially face significant consequences.  
¶36  It is worth noting, as Professor Lessig highlights, that this is not a general call for 
the removal of copyright protections.  Wholesale copyright infringement should always 
be prohibited.  But creative sampling, remixing, and other fair use
106
 or derivative works 
should not be defined as acts of piracy, as doing so places service providers in the 
unsustainable position of being required to determine and apply these copyright 
exceptions.  The question, as always, is one of line drawing and balance.  What 
percentage of a work can be used and still be called a sample?  Law varies significantly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction on this score.  In an online world essentially without 
boundaries, ISPs should not be tasked with determining violations of copyright law, as 
these are determinations that must be done on a case-by-case basis.  But few if any of 
these fact-specific, legal determinations can be easily and cost-effectively built into a 
filtering algorithm.
107
  Case-by-case determination requires people, courts, and a level of 
human judgment, which is why the law should not require ISPs to make such 
determinations or penalize them for failing to police copyright infringement activity of 
their users.  There are simply too many variables requiring case-specific judgment calls 
that are expensive in terms of both money and time.  These are not burdens for service 
providers to undertake on their own.  
¶37  Furthermore, criminalizing service providers incentivizes them to police the 
activity of its users
108—an outsourced policing burden that service providers will have to 
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begrudgingly comply with by creating algorithms to filter content or face stiff criminal 
and/or civil penalties.  Consider the April 2012 German case in which Google was 
ordered to install filtering software onto its YouTube service to prevent the uploading of 
copyrighted material.
109
  In contrast, in May 2012 the French Tribunal de Grande 
Instance declared that YouTube had made adequate efforts to remove copyright protected 
programs without the installation of additional filters or mechanisms prior to the 
uploading of material.
110
  In other words, the German court requires filtering prior to 
uploading material while the French court requires a responsive removal mechanism, 
similar to U.S. law.  How can a service provider keep abreast of and be compliant with 
these various laws with any real level of certainty?  A higher level of certainty must be 
required before we criminalize action/inaction on the part of service providers.   
¶38  Even the higher level of specificity within U.S. law has not stopped individuals and 
industry participants from suing some service providers in U.S. courts.
111
  For example, 
YouTube has developed an advanced content monitoring mechanism that allows rights 
holders to notify YouTube of the presence of content protected by copyright.
112
  The 
system requires rights holders to deliver to YouTube reference files of content they claim 
to own and metadata describing that content.
113
  This information is then used to identify 
content on YouTube allegedly infringing upon the rights of others.  In reality, YouTube’s 
policies and content management system are robust and effective in preventing and 
responding to take down requests.  YouTube even claims to have “maintained a dedicated 
team of employees on call around the clock to assist copyright owners in removing 
unauthorized material.”114  In short, YouTube has undertaken a significant burden that is 
most likely above and beyond what is required under E.U. or U.S. law.  Are we willing to 
ask for an even greater commitment from service providers?  And if they fail to comply 
with the law, are we willing to criminalize their actions or lack thereof?   
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Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
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case of contributory copyright infringement); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that defendant, peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing service Napster, could be held liable for 
contributory infringement and vicarious infringement of the plaintiffs' copyrights); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir.2007) (holding Google's framing and hyperlinking as part of an 
image search engine constituted a fair use of Perfect 10's images because the use was highly 
transformative). 
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and It's Free, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited June 24, 2012). 
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 See id. 
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¶39  Most concerning to the users of YouTube, however, is the fact that the Content ID 
system used by YouTube is an automated system.  Consequently, it lacks human 
judgment and discretion in determining applicable protections for the alleged copyright 
violator.  Instead, the system blocks any and all use of identified copyrighted material.
115
  
The YouTube system makes sense: it is a cost effective mechanism to eliminate the risk 
of YouTube hosting illegal material.  However, the system most likely over captures 
information and communications, is biased towards assertions of intellectual property 
rights holders, and uses little to no human intervention or determinations in the 
process.
116
  This is troubling given many of the concerns raised by the SABAM court.  
Service providers faced with criminal and/or increasingly onerous civil sanctions must 
make risk assessments in the designing of their system that err on the side of over-
capturing information to protect themselves from liability.  This amounts to using the 
threat of criminal sanctions to coerce ISPs to become internet policing bodies, which 
should not be allowed under any circumstances. 
V. THE NEED TO HAVE A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH TO WIDESPREAD  
INFRINGING ACTIVITIES 
¶40  Given the broad and varied nature of online copyright infringement, it’s worth 
considering whether combating piracy in the manner being proscribed is having an 
impact on reducing infringing activity.  As Internet and communication regulators in the 
United Kingdom wrote in ‘Site Blocking’ to Reduce Internet Piracy,117 there has to be a 
“broader package of measures to tackle infringement.”118  I suggest this broader package 
include three key areas of reform to assist service providers: (1) technology cooperative 
initiatives, (2) strengthening and clarifying the law, and (3) creating a truly shared burden 
of protection.   
A. Technology Cooperation 
¶41  Site blocking provides a means to prevent some infringing activity.  However, the 
addition of complementary administrative measures would strengthen the overall 
effectiveness of anti-infringement efforts.  In the UK it has been argued by commentators 
and intellectual property advocates alike that the first step should be to allow websites to 
be served with notice-and-take-down requests, similar to the common practice in the 
United States.
119
  Implementation of such a process would allow service providers to 
react in an expedient manner to the illegal activities of its users.  It is hoped this system 
would provide an incentive for compliance on the part of the service providers as their 
failure to comply might result in sanctions, penalties and/or the loss of revenue from the 
shutting down of the offending website.  In addition, a system such as the one used in the 
U.S. would allow the service provider to ensure over-capture issues are minimized as the 
system could easily accommodate an appeal process and provide protections and 
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117




 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i-vi) (2006). 
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timeframes for the return of a user’s lawful material.  However, as mentioned above, the 
implementation, monitoring and associated costs of such a system should not be borne by 
the service providers alone.  Intellectual property right holders should be expected to 
undertake some of the burden associated with such a system.  The use of a notice-and-
take-down system allows the burden of detection to be rightly placed upon the 
intellectual property rights holders.  The rights holders should also bear some of the ever 
increasing costs associated with the take down requests as well.   
¶42  Even in the face of notice-and-take-down mechanisms and website blocking 
efforts, users truly intent on circumventing intellectual property right protections will find 
a way to distribute and access content unlawfully.  So any proposed measure must 
appreciate the need to block access to infringing websites or user content in a cost-
effective and timely manner.  Arguing that every blocking attempt must be accompanied 
by a court hearing misses the main point: the system must be responsive to immediate 
needs.  If the online community is serious about reducing the copyright infringing activity 
of some of its users, implementation must be done quickly, since much of what 
constitutes infringing activity involves live “feeds”120 and immediate access to pre-
release movies and music. Without the ability to block such immediate activity, much of 
the potential benefit of blocking would be lost.  Consequently, blocking websites via a 
temporary restraining order is currently the only real solution.  However, the actions 
should be short-lived and must provide legal protections for service providers that 
comply with requests that turn out to be baseless.   
¶43  When a website is blocked, the benefits are often short-lived as the operator of the 
website can easily re-establish it at a different IP address, URL, or domain,
121
 and the 
new site can then be “re-found” through a simple search.  Consequently, a system of 
protective measures must take into account search engines.  In January 2012, the British 
Recorded Music Industry (BPI), Motion Pictures Association (MPA), Producers Alliance 
for Cinema and Television (PACT), The Premier League, and the Publishers Association 
proposed an “Anti-Piracy Code of Practice for Search Engines.”122  The proposed code 
requires search engines to relegate sites in their rankings for repeatedly making available 
pirated content.  To facilitate such a change, search engines would be expected to 
promote within their rankings "licensed" or “certified” websites.123  Search engines 
would also agree to stop promoting pirate websites, to not place ads on those sites, and 
refrain from selling keyword advertising related to piracy terminology.
124
  
Unsurprisingly, many of the largest search engines have taken issue with being forced to 
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shoulder such heavy burdens instead of sharing the burden with rights holders.
125
  And 
rightly so, as this is yet another example of conflict being created within an industry that 
could be a key component in creating the cooperation needed to achieve the goal of 
reducing online piracy.  Neither party should bear the bulk of the burden; it should be a 
burden shared by all entities.  However, the use of search engines as part of a broader 
package of technology-based mechanisms working cooperatively to reduce copyright 
infringement is a reasonable burden search providers must be encouraged to embrace.  
Cooperation amongst the technology providers is the only true long-term means of 
reducing online piracy. 
B. Legal Strengthening and Clarification 
¶44  As previously noted, the law is often unclear, poorly designed, and unreflective of 
current social norms.  Without a doubt, copyright laws need to be reviewed
126
 and most 
likely need, at a minimum, to be harmonized if not reimagined as part of a centralized 
system.  Such reforms would allow service providers to fully appreciate legal risks on a 
global scale and to better protect their interests.  Moreover, proper legal reform could 
remove some concerns relating to the need for ongoing court involvement and might 
provide protections for actions that service providers take to protect materials.  Finally, 
many commentators argue that any reform of intellectual property protections should 
include a provision to prohibit circumvention of those protections.
127
  Including such a 
provision would return some of the previous balance of enforcement to intellectual 
property right holders, who would be incentivized to improve protection and anti-
circumvention technology.  Unquestionably, the law should be careful in preventing the 
recording, motion picture and software industries from over-protecting their rights with 
the use of circumvention technology, as the industries should not be able to overly restrict 
its property via contract and legal proscriptions in the face of more open and flexible 
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  But a well-crafted legal reform would appreciate each of these 
attributes and needs and could be crafted precisely as the SABAM court most likely 
intended, with an eye toward balancing the needs and rights of all the parties involved 
within the online community. 
C. A Truly Shared Burden 
¶45  Finally, I would like to emphasize an important actor often forgotten when 
discussing online intellectual property right infringing activity: individual users.  People 
who use the Internet have a vested interest in protecting its usefulness, openness and 
inexpensive availability.  To ensure these attributes are protected the entire online 
community must become involved in a level of self-policing or face the likely reality of 
legislative proscriptions that will impact and most likely curtail freedoms enjoyed by 
Internet users.  Yet few entities highlight the real possibility that individuals may provide 
an appropriate avenue of reducing infringing activity
129
 by increasing their negative 
attitude toward copyright infringement.
130
   
¶46  Currently, the burden of reducing infringing activity online is shared primarily by 
right holders and service providers.  Placing the burden primarily on these two entities 
creates a strange and conflicted online world, in which commercial entities stand in the 
most powerful position when it comes to creating the mechanisms to police it.  This is not 
a situation the online community should accept, as it will create a system of intellectual 
property protections based on economics instead of fairness, due process and freedom.  
¶47  Systems created by right holders and/or service providers will likely be more 
restrictive than the law requires, as both parties need to protect their economic interest.  
For example, consider the business profile of Virgin Media primarily located in Europe.  
Virgin Media has an interest as both an intellectual property rights holder and a service 
provider.  It is not difficult to imagine a monitoring and removal system designed to 
protect both of these interests at the expense of Internet communications freedom.
131
  At 
least one potential example of this dilemma already exists, the previously discussed 
Content ID system used by YouTube.  The YouTube system technically complies with 
the counter-suit requirements of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) but 
does so in a very inefficient manner and provides little redress for lawful users 
wrongfully accused of copyright infringement.  Such a system gives right holders 
substantial control of online content available on the YouTube platform.  In this situation, 
the liability of the system provider holds a more important position in terms of risk 
assessment—as a rights holder (or an entire industry) is more likely to pursue an action 
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against the service provider in court.  In these situations, forgotten are the vast majority 
of online users lawfully uploading content and voluntarily complying with copyright 
protections. Within this system the lawful online users are given no real means to 
challenge the removal or blocking of lawful information as they simply lack resources, 
initiative or legal protections to pursue actions against service providers as individuals.  
Therefore, in addition to calling for a multi-faceted approach to protecting rights holders 
with the cooperation of service providers, it is time to engage lawful Internet users in the 
protection process or the economic interests of businesses and the interests of rights 
holders will be given prominence in creating the system of intellectual property right 
protections in the online world.  Individuals must begin to do their part and ensure they 
are considered within the balance equation.  Such is the balance that courts should 
demand, by spreading the responsibility of ending infringing activities in the online world 
across the entire community. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶48  The Newzbin cases mark a clear shift in the responsibility that European entities 
must take to protect intellectual property rights.  Previously, the burden of protecting 
intellectual property rights fell primarily on rights holders.  Today, however, legislative 
bodies and courts, in both the E.U. and the U.S., have shifted this expectation of 
protections to a shared burden amongst service providers and rights holders.  However, 
SABAM created a cooperative burden to protect intellectual property rights that lacks 
legal proscription and is therefore opening service providers to increased legal 
uncertainty.  While the SABAM court did limit the burden that service providers can be 
expected to undertake to a specific, targeted, and precise injunction requiring the use of 
existing technology, the court has not gone far enough to consider the total burden being 
placed on service providers.  The use of fundamental balances, overly burdensome 
proscriptions, ongoing court intervention, and criminalization of users and service 
providers will not provide a lasting impact in reducing online piracy nor will it reduce 
service providers’ fears of litigation.  Instead, a multifaceted approach must be crafted 
that recognizes and places corresponding burdens on the entire community: rights 
holders, service providers, and regular Internet users.  To accomplish this balance, several 
things must occur: (1) industry and service providers must work together to establish 
technology cooperative initiatives, (2) the law must be crafted in a manner that 
recognizes current online realities and be drafted as regulatory in nature, with an eye 
toward cooperation instead of conflict and over-penalization, and (3) the entire online 
community must recognize a shared burden of intellectual property protections.  This is 
the balance that the next court must seek to achieve. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
